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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court nt Appeals has MD is<i I IUII i i this nuttt i 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1996) and Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) (1988 as amended). 
STATEMENT 01 KSSULS PRESENTED I Ml' Ihh.IEW 
1. Whether the Findings of Fact of the hearing panel are 
supported by substantial record evidence. 
a. As to issues of fact, the appeals court will « hange 
the Agency's Finding only if it "is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
Court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (g) ; King v. Indus. Comm'n of 
Utah, 850 P. 2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993) citing Zissi v. Tax 
Comm'n H4'> P ^d 84R 852-54 (Utah 1992). 
<y . Whether the Agency action in the case of Dr. Taylor's 
license revocation was unconstitutional and whether the Agency has 
engaged i in I wfnl procedure or decision-making process, or has 
failed to follow a prescribed procedure? 
a. I As to issues of general J w, the appeals court 
review *f|rMi< interpretations "under a correction ot error 
standard, giving no deference to the Agency's decision." King v. 
Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993); Utah 
Code Ann, k f»3-46b- 1 h (4 / ( d i . 
b. As to issues of agency specific law, the appeals 
court will determine whether the legislature explicitly granted 
1 
discretion to the Agency to interpret or apply statutory language 
at issue and if such a grant exists, the court will review the 
decision based on an abuse of discretion standard. King v. Indus. 
Comm'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1291 (Utah App. 1993); Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-l6(4)(h)(i). 
If the appeals court does not find an exclusive grant of 
discretion and if the statutory language is broad and expansive or 
subject to numerous interpretations, the appeals court will 
similarly review the decision based on an abuse of discretion 
standard. Id. 
If the language is unambiguous and can be interpreted and 
applied based on traditional methods of statutory construction, the 
appeals court reviews the agency action based on a correction of 
errors standard. Id.; Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d). 
c. An agency's application of law to its factual 
findings will not be disturbed "unless its determination exceeds 
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Rogers v. Division 
of Real Estate, 790 P. 2d 102 (Utah App. 1990) citing Utah 
Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service Comm'n, 658 
P.2d 601 (Utah 1983). 
3. Whether the Agency action proposed in this case was 
contrary to the Agency's prior practice or appropriately justified 
by the Agency upon fair and rational bases. 
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a As \ < issues of general law, the appeals court 
r "news Atjssi ^ interpretations "undei \ correction of error 
standard, giving no deference to the Agency's decision lf King v. 
Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993); Utah 
Code Ann. ', S3-46b- 1 M I |( f 1| . 
I As to issues of agency specific law the appeals 
court will determine whether the legislature explicitly granted 
discretion tn I he Agtinoy to interpret or apply statutory language 
at issue and if such a grant exists, the court will review the 
decision based on an abuse of discretion standard. King v. Indus. 
Comm'n of Utah, 8(>n P MI I^BI, 1291 (Utah App. 1993), Utah Code 
Ann. ', 63-46b-16(4) (h) (i) . 
If the appeals court does not find an exclusive grant of 
discretion and it the statutory language is broad and expansive or 
subject to numerous interpretations, the appeals court will 
similarly review the decision based on an abuse of discretion 
standard. Id. 
If the language is unambiguous and can be interpreted and 
applied based on traditional methods of statutory construction, the 
appeals court reviews the agency action !M I ii UH -J (Direction of 
errors standard. Id.; Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d). 
c. An agency's application of law to its factual 
findings will not be disturbed "unless its determination exceeds 
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality " Rogers v. Division 
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of Real Estate, 790 P. 2d 102 (Utah App. 1990) citing Utah 
Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service Comm'n, 658 
P.2d 601 (Utah 1983). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO APPEAL. 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law.11 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 7. 
(2) The division may refuse to issue a 
license to an applicant and may refuse to 
renew or may revoke, suspend, restrict, place 
on probation, issue* a public or private 
reprimand to, or otherwise act ^up° n the 
license of any licensee in any of the 
following cases: 
(a) the applicant or licensee has engaged 
in unprofessional conduct, as defined by 
statute or rule under this title;" 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-401(2)(a) (1993 as amended) 
(2) "Unprofessional conduct" means conduct, 
by a licensee or applicant, that is defined as 
unprofessional conduct under this title or 
under any rule adopted under this title and 
includes: 
(b) violating, or aiding or abetting any 
other person to violate, any generally 
accepted professional or ethical standard 
applicable to an occupation or profession 
regulated under this title; 
(g) practicing or attempting to practice an 
occupation or profession regulated under this 
title through gross incompetence, gross 
4 
negligence, or a pattern of incompetency or 
negligence; 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501 (2) (b) , (g) 
(6) "unprofessional conduct11 as defined in 
Section 58-1-501 and as may be further defined 
by rule includes: 
(a) applying unsanitary methods or 
procedures in the treatment of any 
animal, contrary to rules adopted by the 
board and approved by the division; 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-28-2 (6) (a) (1993 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10 (full text attached as Appendix 0001) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (full text attached as Appendix 0002-
0003) 
(3) A veterinarian shall maintain a sanitary 
environment to avoid sources and transmission 
of infection to include the proper routine 
disposal of waste materials and proper 
sterilization and/or sanitation of all 
equipment used in diagnosis and/or treatment. 
Utah Admin. Code R156-28-8(3) (1994 as amended) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
1. Petitioner Dr. Leo II. Taylor is » licensed veterinarian 
in the state of Utah and has been licensed and practiced within the 
state since 1956. He maintains a large and small animal veterinary 
practice known i 1 lie Bruokside 'tniinal Hospital II Wpst Jordan, 
Utah. See Transcript of March 18-20, 1996 Hearing, "Transcript," 
316:15 through 317:10 (Appendix 00257). A copy of the Transcript 
is also attached to the Record as a separate document. 
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2. The Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing of 
the Department of Commerce ("Division") filed a Petition against 
Dr. Taylor on February 23, 1995 alleging he violated the Division 
of Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
58-1-101, et seq., and the Veterinary Practice Act §§ 58-28-1, et 
seq. The Division based its allegations against Dr. Taylor on five 
(5) different animals which Dr. Taylor allegedly treated during a 
sixteen (16) month period, July, 1993 to October, 1994. Petition, 
(R 456-468). 
3. A hearing was held on March 48-20, 1996 before 
Administrative Law Judge J. Steven Eklund and a panel of two 
veterinarians and one lay person. At the conclusion of the three-
day hearing, the Division entered a document styled "Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order," which was signed 
by Judge Eklund on April 12, 1996, "Findings", (Appendix 0004 to 
0023). 
4. Oscar, a cocker spaniel was operated on for a broken leg 
by Dr. Taylor, on July 10, 1993. Dr. Taylor repaired the fracture 
by inserting an intramedullary pin into the bone. On July 19, 
1993, Oscar was taken to a second veterinarian who determined the 
fracture was not united and the intramedullary pin was not in its 
proper place. Oscar was later taken to a third veterinarian who 
specialized on orthopedic surgery who, on July 21, 199 3 performed 
a second surgery on Oscar's leg. The Division found that Dr. 
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Taylor did not insert the intramedullary pin in the proper place 
and inappropriately used a galvanized pin and chromic gut in 
setting Oscar's leg. The Division further found that Dr. Taylor 
did not maintain records on Oscar's history and condition. 
Findings, p. 2 5 3 to p. 5 J 13 (Appendix 0005-0008). 
5. Nadia, a chow/lab mix, was treated by Dr. Taylor for 
mastitis on December 23, 1993. The Division found that Dr. Taylor 
failed to maintain adequate records on Nadia's history and 
condition. Findings, p. 5 55 14-17 (Appendix 0008) . 
6. Hillary, an English bulldog owned by Cindy Bue was 
artificially inseminated by Dr. Taylor on April 21 and 23, 1994. 
On June 18, Hillary exhibited labor pains prior to reaching full 
gestation. The Division found that Ms. Bue contacted Dr. Taylor 
and told him about Hillary's apparent labor pains. After Hillary 
passed two dead puppies, Ms. Bue took Hillary to Brookside Animal 
Hospital on June 19 in the morning. Dr. Taylor examined Hillary by 
palpation only, but failed to take an x-ray. Dr. Taylor told Ms. 
Bue the dead puppies were premature. Hillary stayed at Brookside 
Animal Hospital overnight and on June 20, Ms. Bue was informed by 
Brookside that Hillary had passed her last dead puppy and had been 
"flushed out", cleaning her uterus. After being released from 
Brookside, Hillary passed another dead puppy and was taken to a 
different clinic. The second veterinarian Dr. Chinn to an x-ray 
which showed one more puppy inside Hillary and a c-section was 
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performed to help Hillary pass the last dead puppy. The Division 
found that Dr. Taylor did not maintain adequate records regarding 
Hillary's history and conditions. Findings, p. 6 5 18 through p. 
8 J 26 (Appendix 0009-0011). 
7. Shakesbear, a chow-chow owned by Cheryl Devlin was seen 
by Dr. Taylor on May 24, 1994, after Shakesbear fell off a twelve 
(12) foot porch. Ms. Devlin's brother Alvin Dean Schofield took 
Shakesbear to Dr. Taylor who examined Shakesbear, took one x-ray 
and discovered spine and disk injuries. Dr. Taylor told Mr. 
Schofield that there was not a good chance Sliakesbear would walk 
again and that he should consider euthanization to prevent 
Shakesbear from enduring more pain. When Mr. Schofield picked up 
Shakesbear from Brookside Animal Hospital on May 26, Shakesbear was 
purportedly wet and smelled of urine. Shakesbear was taken to a 
veterinary orthopedic specialist who determined that Shakesbear 
could feel pain in his hind quarters and gave Shakesbear a fifty-
fifty (50/50) chance of recovering. Dr. Gary L. Petersen, an 
orthopedic specialist, felt that Dr. Taylor's x-ray should have 
been followed by another x-ray to reach the best diagnosis. The 
orthopedic specialist additionally opined that Shakesbear had urine 
burns because he was left sitting in his urine without the ability 
to move himself due to his injuries. The Division found that Dr. 
Taylor failed to take sufficient x-rays in diagnosing Shakesbear, 
that he did not nurse Shakesbear in a sanitary condition, and 
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failed to maintain adequate records regarding Shakesbear's history 
or conditions. Findings, p. 8 f 27 to p. 9 f 32 (Appendix 0011-
0012). 
8. Char, a Chinese shar-pei was taken to Dr. Taylor on 
October 11, 1994 to be spayed. Char died because she did not take 
the anesthesia well. Dr. Taylor performed a necropsy and opined 
that the dog had died due to an irregularly shaped heart, fluid 
around the heart and pneumonia. A second veterinarian Dr. Scott 
Vande Griend performed a necropsy and opined that the heart was not 
irregularly shaped and that he could find no edema of the lungs 
suggesting pneumonia. The Division concluded that Dr. Taylor 
misdiagnosed the cause of Char's death. Findings, p. 10 5 33-34 
(Appendix 0013). 
9. After setting forth its 34 "Findings of Fact," each 
addressing Dr. Taylor's involvement with the various animals in 
question, the Division made several general, conclusory statements 
without reference to its Findings or the Record. (See Findings, 
pp. 2-10, Appendix 0005-0013) 
10. Commencing on page 13 of the Findings of Fact, the 
Division undertook to define "negligence", "gross negligence" and 
"gross incompetence." See Findings pp. 13-16 (Appendix 0016-0019). 
11. Completing its definition of "negligence", "gross 
negligence" and "gross incompetence" in the context of 
determination of unprofessional conduct, the Division, without 
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more, concluded that Dr. Taylor was grossly incompetent in using a 
galvanized rod and chromic gut in stabilizing Oscar's fractured 
leg, see Findings, p. 16; that Dr. Taylor was grossly incompetent 
in only palpating Hillary in the course of diagnosing her 
condition, see Findings p. 16; and, that Dr. Taylor was grossly 
incompetent in diagnosing Shakesbear's condition without adequate 
x-rays and in making an unsubstantiated prognosis. See Findings, 
p. 17 (Appendix 0020). 
12. The Division also concluded that Dr. Taylor was grossly 
negligent "with respect to the treatment he provided every animal"; 
in his treatment of Oscar; as he failed to take an x-ray in 
diagnosing Hillary's pregnancy and in releasing the dog without 
adequate diagnosis and treatment; was grossly negligent in failing 
to take adequate x-rays of Shakesbear in diagnosing the dog, and in 
providing inadequate nursing observation and maintaining Shakesbear 
in a sanitary environment; and, was grossly negligent in 
misdiagnosing the cause of Char's death. See Findings, pp. 18-19 
(Appendix 0021-0022). 
13. The Division concluded that Dr. Taylor engaged in a 
repeated pattern of negligence in failing to record the medical 
histories, the surgical reports, the progress notes and the 
diagnoses of Oscar, Nadia, Hillary and Shakesbear. Id., pp. 17-18 
(Appendix 0020-0021). 
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14. The Division continued in its Findings that there were 
"numerous aggravating factors which should be considered regarding 
the disciplinary sanction to be imposed in this proceeding.11 
Findings, p. 18 (Appendix 0021). These factors were set forth as 
Dr. Taylor's "multiple instances" of unprofessional conduct which 
supposedly reflected "an inability to provide minimal acceptable 
veterinary care or a callous indifference to the condition and 
needs of those animals," Id.; Dr. Taylor's uniform refusal "to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct to either this 
Board or any of the owners," Findings, p. 19 (Appendix 0022); Dr. 
Taylor's failure to maintain ongoing compliance with those 
professional standards which generally govern all veterinarians in 
the state," Jd. at 19; and the absence of evidence that Dr. Taylor, 
"undertook any good faith efforts to make restitution or rectify 
the consequences of his misconduct." Jd. 
15. Based upon its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
the panel recommended, and the Division adopted the order, that Dr. 
Taylor's license be revoked. See Findings, p. 20 (Appendix 0023); 
see also April 15, 1996 Order of the Division, Director J. Craig 
Jackson, (Appendix 0024). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Division's conclusion that Dr. Taylor was grossly 
incompetent in his treatment of Hillary and Shakesbear is not 
supported by substantial evidence as required by Utah Code Ann. 
11 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(g). No individual or expert testified that Dr. 
Taylor's conduct in handling those two animals manifested an 
extreme deficiency and the basic knowledge and skill in the 
treatment of these animals by Dr. Taylor. 
Similarly, the conclusion by the Board that Dr. Taylor's 
treatment of Hillary, Shakesbear and misdiagnosis of the cause of 
Char's death amounted to gross negligence, is not supported by the 
evidence, nor was the evidentiary finding sufficiently linked to 
the ultimate conclusion of law of the Division. No witness 
testified, nor did any document indicate that the conduct of Dr. 
Taylor was of such an aggravated nature as to manifest 
indifference, utter forgetfulness, or heedless and palpable 
violation of a legal duty or legal obligation. 
The Board also inappropriately considered, what it defined as 
"aggravating factors11 which it considered in the imposition of the 
sanction and revocation of Dr. Taylor's license. These factors 
were not supported by the substantial evidence, and their 
consideration violates Dr. Taylor's due process and constitutes an 
unlawful application of the Administrative Procedures Act. 
Finally, the sanction and revocation of Dr. Taylor's license 
is contrary to the Division's prior practice in dealing with 
veterinary licenses and was not appropriately justified by the 
Division by explanation of fair and rational bases, as required 
under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(h)(iii). The Division's Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Proposed Order is devoid of any 
explanation of fair and rational bases for the revocation of Dr. 
Taylor's license as compared to the prior conduct considered and 
12 
acted upon by the Division. Prior licensees have engaged in abuse 
and misprescription of controlled substances, and in one instance 
criminal fraud, and yet no prior veterinarian has had his license 
revoked. 
The matter should be reversed and remanded to enter Findings 
and Conclusions based on the record and to impose a sanction 
consistent with the prior practice of the Division, 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DIVISION HAS REVOKED DR. TAYLORS LICENSE BASED UPON 
DETERMINATIONS OF FACT NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
One of the bases by which a substantially prejudiced party can 
obtain relief under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, lfUAPA,f, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-0.5 et seq. , is if the conclusions of fact 
and law entered by the administrative agency are not supported "by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (4) (g) . Dr. 
Taylor, a practicing veterinarian for over 40 years, has had his 
licensed revoked as a consequence of the Division's action. 
Whether or not the findings of the Agency are based on 
determinations of fact which are not supported by substantial 
evidence is determined by examining the entire record available to 
the court, not simply that which supports the findings of the 
administrative law judge. [citations omitted] King v. Industrial 
Comm'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993). The 
petitioner has the burden of marshalling "all of the evidence 
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supporting the findings and show[ing] that despite the supporting 
facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, 
the findings are not supported by substantial evidence.11 Id. at 
1285 citing Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P. 2d 63, 68 
(Utah App, 1989). The review imposed by the appeals court is not 
to be as strict as a de novo review or as lenient as the f,any 
competent evidence" review but "simply accords deference to the 
agency where two reasonable, yet conflicting, conclusions could 
have been reached." Id. 
Substantial evidence has been defined by the Utah courts as 
"that which a reasonable person xmight accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.'" King at 1285, citing Stewart v. Board of 
Review, 831 P. 2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Miriam v. Board 
of Review, 812 P. 2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review at 68)). 
In order to fully understand the conclusions reached by the 
Division in this matter, in addition to reviewing the entire 
record, the Court must necessarily interpret issues of general law. 
This Court has previously determined that the level of review 
afforded agency decisions in interpreting issues of general law is 
guided by Utah Code Ann. § 63~46b-16(4) (d) . King at 1285. That 
is, the court interprets agency decisions of general law "under a 
correction of error standard, giving no deference to the agency's 
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decision.11 Id. citing Questar Pipeline Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 817 P. 2d 
316, 318 (Utah 1991). 
With regard to the license of Dr. Taylor to practice 
veterinary medicine in the state of Utah, the Division entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which set out to define 
"gross incompetence" and "gross negligence" as those terms are used 
in the Division's Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501(2)(g). 
The Licensing Act authorizes the Division to revoke, suspend, 
restrict, place on probation, issue a public or private reprimand 
to, or otherwise act upon the license of any licensee who engages 
in "unprofessional conduct". Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-401(2) (a) (1993 
as amended). As applied to the action brought against the license 
of Dr. Taylor, Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501(2) defines unprofessional 
conduct to include: 
(b) Violating . . . any generally accepted 
professional or ethical standard applicable to 
an occupation or profession regulated under 
this title; 
(g) Practicing . . . an occupation or 
profession regulated under this Title through 
gross incompetence, gross negligence, or a 
pattern of incompetency or negligence. 
In order to take the first step in revoking the license of Dr. 
Taylor, it was necessary for the Division to define unprofessional 
conduct, and specifically "gross incompetence", "gross negligence" 
and "pattern of negligence." "Negligence" has been generally 
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defined by the Utah courts as "a failure to exercise the degree of 
care with which a reasonable person would have exercised under the 
same circumstances whether by acting or by failing to act." DCR, 
Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 434-35 (Utah 1983). In a 
criminal context, the Utah courts have defined criminal negligence 
to occur when a person engages in conduct, under circumstances when 
he was aware or ought to be aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will 
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the 
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's stand point. State v. 
Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1312 fn. 5 (Utah App. 1991). In the realm 
of medical malpractice in order to sustain a prima facie case of 
negligence, a plaintiff must show three elements, " (1) the standard 
of care by which the doctor's conduct is to be measured, (2) breach 
of that standard by the doctor, and (3) injury proximately caused 
by the doctor's negligence." Dikeou v. Osborne, 881 P.2d 943, 946 
(Utah App. 1994) citing Chadwick v. Neilsen, 763 P. 2d 817, 821 
(Utah App. 1988). Utah courts have not defined "negligence", 
"gross negligence", or "gross incompetence" in the context of a 
license revocation proceeding. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Division 
defined negligence as "the failure to use the degree of care 
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required under the particular circumstances involved." See 
Findings, p. 15 (Appendix 0018). 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has concluded that gross 
negligence falls on a continuum of culpability between simple 
negligence and intentional conduct, and involves elements of both 
(citing Strange v. Osterlund, 594 P.2d 877, 881 (Utah 1979)), since 
there are no Utah cases defining issues of "competency and 
negligence in a professional setting relative to licensure 
proceedings," the Division looked to other jurisdictions in 
articulating a definition of both. Findings, p. 14. 
"Gross incompetence" was defined by the Division as "an 
extreme deficiency in the basic knowledge and skills necessary to 
practice at the minimum degree of necessary technical expertise or 
ability." [citations omitted] Division's Findings, p. 14. It 
defined "gross negligence" as substantially and appreciably higher 
in magnitude than ordinary negligence, conduct of an aggravated 
character as distinguished from a mere failure to exercise ordinary 
care. See Division's Findings, p. 15. In relying on case law from 
other jurisdictions, the Division used such descriptive terms and 
phrases as "indifference to present legal duty," "forgetfulness of 
legal obligations," "heedless and palpable violation of legal 
duty," and then noted that one body of case law defines "gross 
negligence" in terms of degree, and not kind, while other courts 
and jurisdictions have defined "gross negligence" in terms of the 
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kind of negligence, and not degree. Id. at 15-16. The language of 
this Court in the Strange decision, makes it clear that Utah courts 
have defined "gross negligence11 in terms of degree. See Strange at 
881. The Division falls short in its Order in setting forth the 
elements required of the Division in establishing a claim of 
"negligence", "gross negligence" or "gross incompetence" against 
Dr. Taylor. The Division did not expound on what the Division, in 
the context of a licensing action, must show in order to prove a 
prima facie case. Nor did the Division provide a reasoned basis or 
an explanation of the linkage between its Findrngs of Fact and its 
ultimate Conclusions. The absence of this link is critical to the 
Divisions analysis since, without it, it is impossible to pinpoint 
precisely what standards are required in the industry and under the 
provisions of the Licensing Act, and to what extent they have been 
violated, if at all, by Dr. Taylor. This deficiency is precisely 
the problem addressed by the Utah Supreme Court recently, in the 
yet unpublished opinion of In re: Richard Worthen, No. 95053 6 and 
950537, a portion of the text of which is attached hereto in the 
Appendix, (Appendix 0027) where the court observed 
We expect the Commission's Findings to resolve 
questions of fact and provide an explanation 
of its assessment of the facts so as to 
provide a reasoned basis for its decision. 
There must be an explanation of the linkage 
between the raw facts and the Commission's 
ultimate conclusions, including an explanation 
of why the Commission drew the inferences from 
the facts that it did. Finally, the 
Commission must logically link its factual 
18 
findings and legal conclusions to the 
recommended sanction order to explain why it 
chose one sanction over another. 
Id. at p. 29. This the Division here failed to do. 
After defining negligence as set forth above, the Division 
merely concluded that Dr. Taylor's failure to "record a medical 
history or his physical examination . . ."; "to record an adequate 
surgery report . . . ,lf; M . . . to record progress notes. . . "; 
and, " . . . to record a diagnosis. . ."of Oscar, Hillary Nadia 
and Shakesbear, four of the five dogs treated giving rise to the 
complaints against Dr. Taylor, constituted "^ repeated pattern of 
negligence . . . " See Findings, pp. 17-18 (Appendix 0020-0021). 
After citing the language of the various jurisdictions, as if 
by way of guideline, and without further rational, the Division 
merely concludes that, "[r]espondent [Dr. Taylor] has practiced 
veterinary medicine in both a grossly incompetent and grossly 
negligence manner." Findings, p. 16 (Appendix 0019). 
A. NO EVIDENCE OF GROSS INCOMPETENCE IN DR. 
TAYLORS TREATMENT OF HILLARY AND SHAKESBEAR. 
The evidence elicited at hearing does not support the 
Division's conclusions in several respects. Among other things, 
the Division concluded that Dr. Taylor was "grossly incompetent" in 
his treatment of the dog Hillary, "when he elected to only palpate 
the dog as the sole means to diagnose her condition." The Division 
also concluded that Dr. Taylor was "grossly incompetent" in his 
treatment of Shakesbear, "when he diagnosed that dog's condition 
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without resort to any adequate x-rays" and suggested that the dog 
be euthanized. Findings, p. 16 (Appendix 0019). 
1. Evidence of Treatment of Hillary. 
The Division's claim based on the dog Hillary was supported by 
the testimony of Hillary's owner, Ms. Cindy Bue, and the 
veterinarian Ms. Bue visited subsequent to taking her dog to the 
Brookside Animal Hospital, Dr. Mayling M. Chinn, which spans pages 
150-215 of the transcript (Appendix 0212-0229) . Hillary was an 
English bulldog, which, according to the Findings of the Division, 
was artificially inseminated by Dr. Taylor on April 21, and 23 of 
1994. See Transcript, 155:15-21 (Appendix 0214). On Friday, June 
17, 1994, Hillary went into labor and her owner, Ms. Bue, contacted 
the Brookside Animal Hospital to take in Hillary. See Transcript 
157:6-23 (Appendix 0214). Ultimately, Hillary went into labor and 
delivered all of her pups stillborn. Two of the pups were 
delivered before the animal was brought into the Brookside Animal 
Clinic. Ms. Bue testified that, at Brookside, Dr. Taylor "felt her 
stomach,11 examined the puppy that was stillborn and explained that 
the puppies were all premature, that Hillary was passing them fine 
by herself and no cesarian section would be required. See 
Transcript, 161:5 - 162:15 (Appendix 0215). Hillary, in fact, 
passed other puppies while at the Brookside Animal Clinic but Ms. 
Bue ultimately became impatient and came down and picked up her 
dog. See Transcript 162:16 - 167:6 (Appendix 0215-0217). Ms. Bue 
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then took Hillary home where her labor continued. See Transcript 
168:4 - 170 (Appendix 0217). Hillary bore another stillborn pup. 
Id* Being unable to contact Brookside, Ms. Bue contacted the 
Central Valley Hospital and Dr. Chinn and took Hillary to that 
clinic where Dr. Chinn took x-rays, determined there were still 
puppies unborn and performed a c-section on Hillary, removing the 
last of the stillborn puppies. See Transcript 172:14 - 177:2 
(Appendix 0218-0219). In her testimony, Dr. Chinn testified 
about her treatment of Hillary and interactions with Cindy Bue. 
Her testimony spanned from page 189 through page 212 (Appendix 
0222-0228). In response to the propriety of palpating an English 
bulldog to determine the number and size of the litter, Dr. Chinn 
responded, 
A: Palpation is always something you do on 
an exam. However, on many dogs, especially 
larger breed dogs or the anatomy of a bulldog 
can be difficult to palpate and determine 
number of puppies or if there are even 
puppies. It can be very difficult to do that. 
Q: So would it be appropriate to do a 
radiograph to-. 
A: Yeah. Yeah, radiography is the only way 
to determine first like pregnancy and then 
trying to determine the number of puppies. 
But even a radiograph may not tell you the 
exact number of puppies if there is a large 
litter, all the puppies on top of each other. 
See Transcript, 193:22 to 194:10 (Appendix 0223). 
In conclusion of her direct testimony, the following exchange 
took place: 
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Q: Do you have an opinion about the standard 
of care that Dr. Taylor provided for Hillary? 
A: As far as the medical history or just 
overall? 
Q: Well, based upon your review of the 
medical history and what Ms. Bue told you, do 
you have an opinion as to the standard of care 
that Dr. Taylor provided for Hillary? 
A: I think initially in my opinion and also 
what is substantiated in our current 
veterinary texts that a thorough physical 
examination as well as performing at least an 
abdominal radiograph would have been helpful 
to assess the nature for Hillary. 
Q: Based upon what you know tha1^ ~ is that 
there was no radiograph performed by Dr. 
Taylor, did the standard of care that he 
provided for Hillary fall below the accepted 
standard? 
A: From the information that I have, I feel 
that it did. 
See Transcript 204:14 to 205:7 (Appendix 0226). 
There is no further testimony from Dr. Chinn or any other 
veterinarian to the effect that Dr. Taylor's failure to palpate 
Hillary or take a radiograph constituted ffan extreme deficiency in 
basic knowledge and skill", that is, gross incompetence as defined 
by the Division. Further, by comparing what the Utah courts have 
required in establishing a prima facie case in medical malpractice 
cases, see Dikeou v. Osborne, 881 P.2d 943, 946 (Utah App. 1994), 
there was no evidence offered by the Division of "the standard of 
care by which the doctor's conduct is to be measured," or that 
injury ensued proximately caused by Dr. Taylor's negligence. See 
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supra. The evidence provided by the Agency did not satisfy the 
prima facie requirements typically recognized in this Court in a 
malpractice context, much less a finding of gross incompetence, as 
that term has been defined by the Division and courts of other 
jurisdictions. 
2. Evidence of Treatment of Shakesbear. 
The Division also concluded that Dr. Taylor was grossly 
incompetent "when he diagnosed [Shakesbear7s] condition without 
resort to any adequate x-rays" and suggested the dog be euthanized. 
Findings, at p. 17 (Appendix 0020). Shakesbear was a male chow-
chow that fell off a twelve-foot porch, injured its back and was 
taken to the Brookside Animal Hospital on May 24, 1994. See 
Transcript 77:2 - 78:17 (Appendix 0194). After examining the chow 
and taking one x-ray, Dr. Taylor suggested that the chow be 
euthanized. See Transcript 77:19 - 78:17 and 87:8, 89:3 (Appendix 
0194; 0196-0197). Seeking a second opinion, Alvin Dean Schofield, 
the brother of Shakesbear's owner, took the half-paralyzed 
Shakesbear to Dr. Gary Petersen. On the stand, after reviewing the 
radiograph taken by the Brookside Animal Clinic and Dr. Taylor, Dr. 
Petersen testified 
A: This is a radiograph of what appears to 
be a dog, spinal x-ray primarily showing from 
about the ninth or tenth-eighth or ninth rib 
down to the level of the pelvis in generally 
what would be considered a dorsal/ventral or 
ventral/dorsal view. 
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Q: Do you have an opinion as to whether any 
of the disks along that spinal column are 
misaligned or out of position? 
A: Based on this radiograph, I can't define 
any of them that are necessarily misaligned, 
no. There is some rotation of the spine. It 
tips (indicating), so it isn't an ideal view. 
Usually we see two views at the very least to 
make any determination of any sort. But based 
on what I'm seeing here, I cannot see obvious 
misalignment. 
Q: You indicated that usually you see two 
views. Would it be appropriate for further 
radiographs to be taken to make a diagnosis? 
A: In my opinion yes. 
See Transcript 107:21 - 108:14 (Appendix 0202). 
On cross-examination, Dr. Petersen testified that he has a 
specialty interest in neurology, although he is not a specialist in 
neurology. He was then asked 
Q: Do all veterinarians have the same 
gualifications in that direction that you do? 
A: No, I don't believe so. 
There is no further testimony given with respect to x-rays in the 
diagnosis of these types of injuries. Notably there is no 
testimony given of the veterinary standard used in the diagnosis of 
spinal injuries, and in particular the use of radiographs in such 
diagnoses. Hence, under the standards typically applied by this 
Court in the medical malpractice arena, the Division failed to put 
on a prima facie case of negligence. Much more, there is no 
evidence that Dr. Taylor's failure to take a second x-ray manifests 
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an extreme deficiency in basic knowledge and skill in the practice 
of veterinary medicine• The best testimony which the Division 
could rely on in reaching its conclusion is that Dr. Petersen, 
"usually we see two views at the very least to make any 
determination of any sort." See Transcript 108:7-8 (Appendix 
0202). The Agency's conclusion that Dr. Taylor's conduct in the 
treatment of Hillary and Shakesbear constituted gross incompetence 
is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(g) (Appendix 
0002). This deficiency in the evidence was apparently recognized 
by counsel in his opening and closing statement when he stated, 
"That's important to remember because we're really talking about 
malpractice here, the fact that Dr. Taylor has engaged in 
malpractice. And any time that happens, we have someone who feels 
like they've been damaged through that malpractice . . .If See 
Transcript 19:22 - 20:1 (Appendix 0180). And continued in his 
closing 
It's the Division's position that it has 
presented evidence to you that Dr. Taylor has 
acted in a pattern of negligence. We have at 
least four cases here and all five of them, 
this is true, Dr. Taylor fell below the 
standard of care. And that's the legal 
definition of negligence, so we have a 
pattern. We also have a case here that 
involves gross negligence. And that's the 
Oscar case. Remember, that's an extreme 
departure from the standard of care. And it 
was Dr. Smith's opinion that Dr. Taylor 
engaged in an extreme departure from the 
standard of care [in treating Oscar]. . . 
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See Transcript 494:5-15 (Appendix 0303). 
B. NO EVIDENCE OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE IN DR. TAYLOR'S TREATMENT 
OF HILLARY, SHAKESBEAR AND CHAR. 
Similarly, the evidence which came in during the hearing does 
not support the Division's conclusion that Dr. Taylor was grossly 
negligent, as that term has been defined by the Division, in 
several respects. 
1. Evidence of Treatment of Hillary. 
The Division concluded that Dr. Taylor, "was grossly negligent 
when he took no x-ray to accurately and adequately diagnose 
Hillary's condition and when he improperly released that dog 
without adequate diagnosis and treatment.11 Findings, p. 17 
(Appendix 0020). The sum total of the direct testimony given upon 
which the Division relied in reaching its conclusion is set forth 
above in the discussion of gross incompetence. Dr. Mayling M. 
Chinn, the expert relied on by the Division in putting on its case, 
did not testify whatsoever as to the propriety of Dr. Taylor 
releasing Hillary when he did. Further, her testimony as to her 
overall impressions of Dr. Taylor's treatment, and whether that 
treatment met any standard, is set forth in full text above. The 
testimony elicited does not even satisfy any sort of a prima facie 
showing of negligence, much less prove conduct of an aggravated 
character, substantially and appreciably higher in magnitude than 
ordinary negligence, manifesting an indifference to present legal 
duty, forgetfulness of legal obligations or a heedless and palpable 
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violation of legal duty, as the Division has defined gross 
negligence. The evidence at hearing does not support the 
Division's conclusion that Dr. Taylor was grossly negligent in his 
treatment of Hillary. 
2. Evidence of Treatment of Shakesbear. 
The Division concluded that Dr. Taylor was grossly negligent 
in his treatment of Shakesbear as he failed to "take an adequate x-
ray to accurately diagnose the condition of that dog" and "failed 
to provide adequate nursing observation and care as to maintain 
Shakesbear in a sanitary environment." Findings, p. 17 (Appendix 
0020) . The sum total of any evidence which came in at the hearing 
which can even remotely be construed to support a finding of a 
standard and a breach of that standard with respect to supposed 
inadequate x-rays is set forth in toto above. The statement of Dr. 
Gary Petersen that in his opinion it would be "appropriate for 
further radiographs to be taken to make a diagnosis" is not 
adequate under Utah law or under the cases cited by the Division in 
articulating a definition of gross negligence, to support such a 
finding with respect to Dr. Taylor's diagnosis of Shakesbear. See 
Transcript 107:21 to 108:14 (Appendix 0202) cited and set forth 
supra. 
In regard to the Division's conclusion that Dr. Taylor failed 
to provide adequate nursing observation and maintain Shakesbear in 
a sanitary environment, the following evidence was elicited. 
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First, Alvin Dean Schofield, Shakesbear's owner's brother, who was 
present when the dog was injured and took the injured animal to the 
Brookside Animal Hospital, testified that after being advised by 
Dr. Taylor that Shakesbear ought to be euthanized he concluded that 
he wanted a second opinion. See Transcript, 88:22 through 89:20 
(Appendix 0197). Mr. Schofield went to the Brookside Animal 
Hospital to pick up the dog and then was asked to describe what he 
saw as Shakesbear was brought outside the clinic to his car. 
A: Well, I drove my truck around there to 
the back where I'd guess they had this garage 
that they keep them in. It was all cement. 
And when he'd [Dr. Taylor] broughten (sic) 
Shakesbear out, I mean, he just reeked of 
urine so bad it was ungodly. And the thing 
that amazed me the most is when he did bring 
him out, he held Shakesbear by the tail to 
hold up his hind quarters. And it looked 
like, you know, he was wet so they had like 
squirted him off just before they had brought 
him out. I wrapped him up in a blanket and 
put him in the truck. And that's when I drove 
him directly over to Town and Country. 
In State's Exhibit "10", a letter prepared by Mr. Schofield dated 
September 28, 1994, over four months after Shakesbear was taken to 
the Brookside Animal Hospital, Mr. Schofield described, "Shakesbear 
was brought in a room in the blanket I had brought him in with, he 
was muzzled and smelled of urine.ff When he came to pick up 
Shakesbear from the Brookside Animal Hospital, Mr. Schofield 
described in his letter, ff[w]hen he came out, Shakesbear was wet 
and smelled extremely bad like urine. He had squirted him off with 
water . . . " See State's Exhibit "10", R 327. 
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In response to the examination of one of the board members, 
Mr. Sperry, Mr, Schofield responded as follows: 
Q: When you had the dog at Dr. Petersen's 
clinic, was it catheterized the whole time it 
was there? Do you know? 
A: As far as I know, I'd taken the dog in 
there and gotten his—left it there until he 
gave me a prognosis on it. And from that time 
on, I think he had said that it would have to 
be catheterized and it was. When I next saw 
the dog, he'd been shaved where all the burns 
were and he was washed up because he reeked of 
urine so bad. I mean, I had to throw the 
blanket out. The thing was just ungodly 
because of the urine smell on it. But he was, 
I would say, twice to ten times better care of 
him. I mean, he was clean. 
See Transcript 97:20 through 98:8 (Appendix 0199). 
Dr. Petersen, the veterinarian who saw Shakesbear after it had 
been removed from the Brookside Clinic testified in regard to the 
condition of Shakesbear when presented at his clinic as follows: 
Q: Could you tell the Board what you 
observed when you examined Shakesbear on May 
26, 1994? 
A: Yes. The dog was brought in paralyzed in 
the rear legs, unable to move his rear legs. 
It's rear end was soggy with urine, and the 
dog smelled of urine. The towel he was in was 
actually damp with what appeared to be urine. 
There was a severe urine scald over the 
scrotum and thighs on both thighs of the dog. 
The hair was just all matted and sectioned in 
that soggy urine moisture. 
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Q: What would be the type of appropriate 
nursing care for an animal that was in 
Shakesbear's condition? 
A: The dog certainly should have been 
catheterized to relieve that urine to drain 
bladder at least intermittently to prevent the 
urine scalding, raised on a rack or adapter 
that would allow the urine to drip away from 
the dog and not remain in contact with the 
dog's skin. If the hair became saturated, the 
hair would need to be shaved off so it just 
doesn't go into that urine moisture. 
Q: Do you have an opinion as to the type of 
nursing care that was provided for Shakesbear? 
A: In my opinion, it did not appear that 
this dog had received any care as far as 
treating this urine burn at all. 
Q: In your opinion, did the care it received 
fall below the standard of care? 
A: In my opinion, yes. 
See Transcript, 103:9 through 105:2 (Appendix 0201). 
While all the evidence submitted could reasonably be construed 
to support a conclusion of negligence, with respect to the nursing 
and observation provided Shakesbear by Dr. Taylor and Brookside 
Animal Hospital, it does not support a conclusion of gross 
negligence. There is no evidence that Dr. Taylor's conduct was of 
an aggravated character, substantially and appreciably higher in 
magnitude from ordinary negligence. See Findings, p. 15 (Appendix 
0018). There is no evidence of indifference, forgetfulness or 
heedless and palpable violation of any sort of legal duty or 
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obligation. Id. Hence, the Division's conclusion that the nursing 
care provided Shakesbear by Dr. Taylor amounted to gross negligence 
is not supported by the evidence of record. 
Moreover, there was no evidence presented at the hearing that 
the sanitary condition of the Brookside Animal Clinic facility fell 
below any articulated standard, much less was so far below as to be 
considered aggravated in character, or substantially and 
appreciably higher in magnitude than ordinary negligence. While 
the theme of the Brookside Animal Clinic being an unsanitary 
facility was introduced in the opening statement, the only evidence 
which could even remotely be argued to support such a conclusion is 
that with respect to the condition of Shakesbear, noted above, the 
testimony of Dr. Taylor, and that of Lori Larsen, an investigator 
for the Division. Dr. Taylor testified as follows: 
Q: One of the Division's allegations is that 
your facilities are unsanitary. 
A: Yeah. In a previous statement that was 
given by Lori Larsen that she answered the 
question of why she wrote that we have an 
unsanitary facility is that she saw a loose 
cat in the office. And the other one was that 
there was a dog that had urine stains on it 
and moist eczema; that she testified that it 
had all that urine burn and moist eczema. And 
what had taken place on the dog, any time you 
have damaged tissue on a dog, sometimes it 
takes about three days or four days before it 
starts to separate and to die and actually 
fall away. 
Q: During the investigation of you which 
took over a year, did anybody ever come out 
from the Board of Health or from the Division 
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or anybody else come out and inspect your 
facilities out there for sanitation or other 
purposes? 
A: No. No, and I might further comment, 
maybe I shouldn't, but in what she wrote up in 
that report saying we are dirty and 
unsanitary, I challenged her on that, that she 
could go out to other facilities without being 
announced and compare. 
See Transcript 346:20 through 347:17 (Appendix 0265). 
Dr. Taylor further testified in response to the questions of 
panel members: 
Dr. Rees: Yes. There were some questions 
raised about sanitation, that sort of thing. 
And was Shakesbear bathed? Was he ever 
bathed? This is the dog with the paralysis. 
A: Certainly they were cleaned up night and 
morning and put on clean towels or blankets. 
And you know as well as I, some of those cats 
that have FUS, that you have to put them on 
crates. And we do have a grate that we keep 
dogs on. A lot of times they'll crawl off the 
grate if they're in a big enough area, not in 
a small enclosure. 
Dr. [Denzel E. ] Taylor: You offered to have 
the dog cleaned up before Mr. Schofield took 
it home? 
The witness: I certainly did. I offered to 
have him come back and get it or whatever. We 
did not have some help there until later, and 
we bathe it and clean the dog up before he 
took it home. And he said, MOh, no, he'd take 
it." That was fine. 
Dr. [Denzel E.] Taylor: Do you clean kennels 
night and morning? Is that part of the 
routine at the hospital? 
A: Right. 
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See Transcript 398:24 through 399:21 (Appendix 0278). 
Finally, Lori Larsen testified on cross-examination with 
respect to the sanitary conditions of the Brookside Animal 
Hospital: 
Q: You were out at the hospital on three, 
four different occasions. You are the one who 
signed the Petition against Dr. Taylor, are 
you not? 
A: Yes, I am. 
Q: And in it you made allegations of 
unsanitary conditions and various other sorts 
of allegations. Let me ask you this, did you 
at any time during your investigation" ever ask 
to see the operating room or where the kennels 
are, where the dogs are kept, any of the 
sterilization equipment or did you ask to go 
through the hospital? 
(Objection made and ruled upon) 
Q: (by Mr. Dahl) Let me ask you this. Did 
you ever go through the hospital? 
A: No, I didn't take a tour of the hospital. 
Q: And why not? 
A: Well, I didn't need to. I wasn't there 
to inspect the hospital. I was there to talk 
with Dr. Taylor about the various allegations 
and get his perspective on each of them. 
See Transcript, 466:13 through 467:14 (Appendix 0296). 
Upon the examination of one of the board members, Mr. Sperry, 
Lori Larsen responded as follows: 
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Q: And you did not physically inspect the 
operation of Dr. Taylor's at all. You just 
were in his front reception area and the 
office area? 
A: That's correct. I signed the Petition 
which contains all of the allegations, but the 
allegations are based on all of the 
information that's been gathered. So 
allegations of unsanitary conditions or 
unprofessional conduct are all based on the 
testimony of all the witnesses. And I signed 
the Petition for the investigating officer, 
but I did not inspect the facility myself. 
See Transcript 470:22 to 471:7 (Appendix 0297). 
On redirect, Ms. Larsen was led by the Division's counsel as 
follows: 
Q: Mrs. Larsen, maybe we can clarify the 
issues of sanitary conditions. Is it true 
that the allegations of unsanitary conditions 
relate to individual animals rather than the 
facility itself? 
A: That's correct. 
See Transcript 472:9-13 (Appendix 0297). No further testimony 
exists with respect to the unsanitary nature of the Brookside 
Animal Hospital, or any facility or aspect of the facility operated 
by Dr. Taylor. No evidence was introduced as to sanitation at 
other local animal hospitals. The condition of one animal found to 
have been treated by Dr. Taylor does not substantially support the 
conclusion that the operation, maintenance and overall sanitary 
condition of the Brookside Animal Hospital, Dr. Taylor's facility, 
was operated below an established degree of care with which a 
reasonable person would have exercised under the same circumstances 
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c . ." of DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P. 2d 433, 434-35 (Utah 
1983) . Nor does it support the conclusion and finding of 
negligence as that term is defined by the Division in its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. See Findings p. 15 (Appendix 
0018) . It is a far greater leap and an even less substantially 
supported conclusion for the Division to have determined that the 
sanitary condition of Dr. Taylor's facility was maintained in a 
grossly negligent manner. See Findings, p. 17 (Appendix 0020). 
While, at best, substantial evidence may support the conclusion 
that Dr. Taylor was negligent in diagnosing and nursing Shakesbear, 
there is no evidence in the record which supports a conclusion of 
gross negligence with respect to any aspect of Dr. Taylor's care of 
Shakesbear or his failure to maintain a sanitary environment. 
3. Evidence of Treatment of Char. 
Finally, the Division concludes that Dr. Taylor was grossly 
negligent, "when he misdiagnosed the cause of Char's death.11 
Findings, p. 17 (Appendix 0020). Char was a shar-pei, owned by 
Stephanie Picklesimer, who took Char into Dr. Taylor to get spayed. 
See Transcript, 119:1-11 (Appendix 0205). She was contacted the 
next morning and told that Char had not taken the anesthetic well 
and had died. Dr. Taylor suggested he could do an autopsy if Ms. 
Picklesimer wanted him to. She instructed him to proceed. See 
Transcript, 119:12-23 (Appendix 0205). After the autopsy was 
completed, Dr. Taylor contacted Ms. Picklesimer and told her that 
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Char "had pneumonia in both lungs, that she had an irregularly 
shaped heart, and there was fluid around the heart.11 Id. p. 122:20 
through 123:2 (Appendix 0205-0206). This diagnosis was borne out 
by the State's Exhibit 15, a letter from Dr. Taylor to Ms. 
Picklesimer. Not being satisfied, Mr. and Ms. Picklesimer picked 
up Char's carcass and took it to the All Pet Complex for another 
necropsy. The All Pet Complex performed a necropsy, informed the 
Picklesimers that there was no pneumonia in either lung and Char's 
heart was normal. See Transcript, 128:20 through 129:13 (Appendix 
0207) . 
The State's expert, Dr. Scott Vande Griend testified that he 
conducted the necropsy of Char and, at the conclusion describing 
his findings, answered the following questions. 
Q: (By Mr. Allred) Dr. Vande Griend, are 
you familiar with the conclusions of Dr. 
Taylor's autopsy? 
A: Yes, I received a copy of that just the 
other day. I hadn't seen it until then. At 
the time, I just had Mr. Picklesimer's 
anecdotal report of pneumonia. 
Q: Do you agree with Dr. Taylor's conclusion 
that Char died of pneumonia and an irregularly 
shaped heart? 
A: No, I do not. 
Q: In your professional opinion, is there 
any excuse for the conclusion that Dr. Taylor 
reached when he performed a necropsy on Char? 
A: No, I do not. In particular, if there 
was suspicion of pneumonia, some 
histopathology or microscopic studies should 
36 
have been submitted, which were not. I 
disagree. 
Q: In your opinion, did Dr. Taylor's 
conclusions in his necropsy fall below the 
standard of care in the profession for 
performing a necropsy? 
A: Yes. 
See Transcript, 134:17 through 135:12 (Appendix 0208-0209). 
On cross-examination, Dr. Vande Griend testified that he could 
not conclude from the necropsy what the cause of Char's death was. 
He was then asked: 
Q: Let me ask this. Neutering animals is an 
almost every day occurrence in veterinary 
medicine, is it not? 
A: Yes, very common surgery, uh huh. 
Q: And let me ask you this. Have you ever 
performed a surgery of this type and lost an 
animal? 
A: Yes, I have. 
Q: So in normal course of events, sometimes 
animals die from this procedure? 
A: That is correct. But in the normal 
course of events in necropsy, if there is a 
physical finding in necropsy, it's not normal 
to report something that's not there. 
Q: So what you do is you have a difference 
of opinion with Dr. Taylor? 
A: Exactly. 
See Transcript, 136:5-20 (Appendix 0209). Dr. Vande Griend also 
testified that Char's pericardial sac had been opened. nSo if 
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there was any fluid on the heart, I couldn't determine that because 
it had leaked out." 
Q: Were there any incisions into the lung? 
A: I can't recall. I don't believe there 
were, but I can't say for certain because I 
can't exactly recall. 
See Transcript, 143:1-13 (Appendix 0211). 
A second expert called by the Division, Dr. Bret Neville, 
observed Dr. Vande Griend's necropsy of Char. He was then shown 
Dr. Taylor's conclusions as to the cause of death and asked if he 
agreed, to which he responded, 
A: I do not. I saw no indication of a 
pneumonia. The heart appeared to me to be of 
normal size and normal consistency and normal 
shape and had no indication of fluid around 
the heart because, again, it was kind of--the 
pericardial sac was cut open. 
Q: Do you have a professional opinion as to 
whether it's acceptable to make a misdiagnosis 
on this type of necropsy? 
A: Anesthetic deaths or risk are always a 
concern whenever an animal is under 
anesthetic, and that's something that happens 
to every veterinarian I know. There is no 
indication of what Dr. Taylor said on the 
necropsy, so we still don't have an answer 
what caused it. But I guess I don't 
understand why Dr. Taylor said pneumonia and 
irregularly shaped heart when there wasn't. 
Q: So is there an excuse for the conclusion 
he reached? 
A: None that I can see. 
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See Transcript, 148:7 through 149:1 (Appendix 0212). Again, the 
evidence elicited at hearing falls short of supporting the Board's 
conclusion that Dr. Taylor's necropsy of Char and postmortem 
diagnosis was grossly negligent. 
In all, no substantial evidence supports the Board's finding 
that Dr. Taylor acted in a grossly incompetent or grossly negligent 
way in the treating of Hillary, Shakesbear or the postmortem 
diagnosis of Char. At the very best, the findings of the Board 
which are supported by substantial evidence include an extreme 
departure in the care given one animal, Oscajr, and negligence on 
behalf of Dr. Taylor and the Brookside Animal Hospital staff in his 
treatment of one animal, Shakesbear, and in the keeping and 
maintaining of medical records of animal histories, medical 
procedures, progress notes, and diagnoses of four animals. These 
findings were made as to a veterinarian who has practiced in the 
state for approximately forty years with no prior discipline 
sanction. See Transcript, 316:20-24 (Appendix 0257), Findings, p. 
19 (Appendix 0022). Yet based on its findings, the Division 
imposed its most severe penalty allowed under the Act, that of 
revocation. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-401(2) (a) (1993 as amended). 
The conclusion of the Division and imposition of the penalty of 
revocation in this case is unprecedented and not at all reasonably 
explained by the Division in its Findings and Conclusions. See 
Argument, infra. 
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C. THE DIVISION'S FINDING OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IS 
NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, VIOLATES DUE 
PROCESS AND CONSTITUTES UNLAWFUL DECISION MAKING PROCESS. 
In its final analysis of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, the Division concluded that M[t]here are numerous 
aggravating factors which should be considered regarding the 
disciplinary sanction to be imposed in this proceeding." Findings, 
p. 18 (Appendix 021). Those so-called "aggravating factors" are 
(1) multiple instances of unprofessional conduct which reflect 
either an inability to provide minimally acceptable veterinary care 
or a callous indifference to the condition and needs of those 
animals, Id.; (2) Dr. Taylor's uniform refusal to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature of his misconduct to either the Board or any of the 
owners of animals in question, Findings, p. 19 (Appendix 0022) ; (3) 
Dr. Taylor's inexcusable failure to "maintain ongoing compliance" 
with professional standards which generally govern all 
veterinarians in the State, Id.; and (4) that there is, "no 
evidence [Dr. Taylor] undertook any good faith efforts to make 
restitution or rectify the consequences of his misconduct." Id. 
No evidence supports this Finding of the Division of "aggravated 
factors." Moreover, the imposition by the Division of item nos. 
(2) and (4) above violates Dr. Taylor's due process and constitutes 
an unlawful decision making process or a failure to follow a 
prescribed procedure. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (e) (1988 
as amended). 
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1. Multiple instances of unprofessional 
conduct reflecting inability to provide 
minimally acceptable veterinary care or 
callous indifference to the conditions 
and needs of animals. 
The record before the Court does not support this conclusion. 
Relevant portions of the record and the evidence elicited below 
upon which such conclusions can be based are more fully set forth 
in the arguments above. As was recognized by counsel for the 
Division in his closing statement, at best the record evidence 
supports the conclusion that Dr. Taylor and his facility were 
negligent in the handling of five animals. In treating one of 
those animals, Oscar, according to the State's expert, Dr. Dale 
Smith, Dr. Taylor's conduct was an extreme departure from the 
accepted standard of practice. See Transcript, 276:1-20 (Appendix 
0247). There was no evidence below of Dr. Taylor being indifferent 
or callous as to the needs of the animals he treated. Nor is there 
evidence that Dr. Taylor "inexcusably failed to maintain ongoing 
compliance" with the professional standards which govern all 
veterinarians in the state. See Findings, p. 19 (Appendix 0022). 
The evidence was that Dr. Taylor had seen somewhere in the 
neighborhood of 40,000 animals during the time period in question, 
and only five of those animals gave rise to the complaint set forth 
in the Division's Petition. There was no other testimony or 
documentary evidence that Dr. Taylor's conduct permeated his entire 
practice, extended beyond the five animals in question or in any 
41 
way impacted any other animals. As if to rebut Mrs, Taylor's and 
Dr. Taylor's testimony as to the number of other satisfied 
customers, counsel for the Division in his closing statement 
inappropriately stated, without reference to, or reliance on, any 
evidence before the Division, 
The reason that five cases have appeared in 
this case is a question of time. We've been 
here two and a half days, and we've gone over 
five incidences (sic). It's true that Dr. 
Taylor has treated a large number of animals. 
It's also true that the Division had more 
complaints than these five. The Division 
selected the five strongest complaints that 
would show a pattern of negligence and, in one 
instance, a case of gross negligence. It's 
not necessary to put on every complaint that's 
brought to the Division's attention. Just 
like it's not necessary if someone is charged 
with bank robbery to put on evidence of every 
bank they didn't rob, it's not necessary for 
the Division to put on evidence of satisfied 
customers. All that's important is that the 
conduct that Dr. Taylor engaged in constitutes 
either simple negligence or gross negligence. 
See Transcript 504:6-24 (Appendix 0305). No evidence suggested 
that Dr. Taylor's conduct extended beyond these animals in 
question. No evidence indicated Dr. Taylor was indifferent or 
callous toward the needs of the animals. It is only counsel for 
the Division's inappropriate statement, which is not evidence, upon 
which the Division could rely to reach its conclusion with respect 
to aggravation of Dr. Taylor's conduct. 
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2. Refusal to Acknowledge Wrongful Nature of 
Misconduct To the Board or Owners, No 
Evidence of Good Faith Efforts to Make 
Restitution or Rectify Consequences of 
Misconduct. 
No evidence supports the conclusion by the Division that Dr. 
Taylor's conduct was aggravated by his failure to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature or to undertake good efforts to restitute or 
rectify the consequences of his misconduct. The only statements 
made in the transcript which could directly support such conclusion 
are the statements of counsel for the Division in his closing 
argument, which statements are notably not fact. Counsel proceeds: 
Revocation is a serious thing, as I'm 
sure you can understand. We're talking about 
taking away the license of a veterinarian, 
taking away his ability to earn a livelihood. 
And revocation isn't asked for from the 
Division very lightly. In this case, we have 
a situation where Dr. Taylor has not accepted 
responsibility for any of these incidents. As 
you review the evidence, I think you'll see 
that Dr. Taylor has in each instance blamed 
someone else for the conduct involved here to 
one degree or another, some more egregious 
than others when you look at who he has blamed 
and who he has pointed the finger at. 
Dr. Taylor really hasn't owned up to 
anything. . . . 
See Transcript, 494:23 through 495:1- (Appendix 0303). Counsel for 
the Division then continues in his reply: 
You know, I have feelings just like 
anyone else. And when Mr. Dahl said that Dr. 
Taylor's daughter is going to veterinary 
college and hopes to join Dr. Taylor within a 
year, I have the same reaction you probably 
have. That would be nice. But Dr. Taylor has 
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never had the attitude during this entire case 
or in the investigation before this case that 
he wanted to work something out. That's 
because he has never taken responsibility for 
what's occurred here. And the Division felt 
that it was importcint for you to hear the 
evidence so that you could decide if there's a 
risk to the public here. . . . This does not 
seem to be an individual who can be retrained 
or reeducated in his practice. It seems to be 
an individual who just won't own up to the 
conduct that I believe has proved by a 
preponderance of that evidence, by a greater 
weight. So there's nothing really the 
Division can do in working with Dr. Taylor to 
protect the public. 
See Transcript, 504:25 through 505:22 (Appendix 0305). 
The Division does not attempt to include in its Findings of 
Fact a finding along the lines of aggravation to the extent that it 
supports its conclusion of aggravated circumstances. See Findings, 
pp. 2-10 (Appendix 0005-0013). Indeed, no evidence supports the 
Division's conclusion of aggravation. 
3. Violation of Due Process, Unlawful 
Process and Departure from Prescribed 
Procedure. 
Further, in its definition of unprofessional conduct and those 
provisions under which the Division has revoked Dr. Taylor's 
license, Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-401 (2) (a) and § 58-1-501 (2) (b) and 
(g) / § 58-28-2(6) and Utah Administrative Rule 156-28-8(3) (1994), 
there is no provision that failure to acknowledge, to make 
restitution or to rectify alleged wrongdoing is definitionally 
unprofessional conduct or a basis to revoke a license or take any 
action against the licensee. Nor did the Division alleged in its 
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Petition against Dr. Taylor that lack of contrition might 
constitute unprofessional conduct or aggravate the sanction 
ultimately imposed. See Petition, R 456-468. 
It is clearly established that professionals who risk losing 
their professional licenses or means of employment through action 
of a public disciplinary body are entitled to due process. See 
e.g. In Re Kirk v. Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing, 815 P.2d 242, 244 (Utah App. 1991); and DB First v. 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 779 P. 2d 1145, 
1149 (Utah App. 1989) (social worker's license). Accordingly, to 
afford licensees due process, the hearing must be prefaced by 
timely notice which adequately informs the parties of specific 
issues they must be prepared to meet. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P. 2d 
1207, 1213 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted). In order not to 
deprive the parties of due process, the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that the Agency's 
findings must be based on evidence presented 
in the case, with an opportunity to all 
parties to know of the evidence to be 
submitted or considered, to cross-examine 
witnesses, to offer evidence in explanation or 
rebuttal and nothing can be treated as 
evidence which is not introduced as such. 
If the [agency] had intended to entertain the 
issue of unqualified cancellation, it should 
have notified [petitioner] and informed him 
specifically of the grounds upon which 
cancellation was being sought. 
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Morris v. Public Service Comm'n, 321 P. 2d 644, 64 6 (Utah 1958) 
(citations omitted). It is also clearly established that due 
process 
is not a technical concept that can be reduced 
to a formula with a fixed content unrelated to 
time, place, and circumstances. Rather, the 
demands of due process rest on the concept of 
basic fairness of procedure and demand a 
procedure appropriate to the case and just to 
the parties involved. 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983). 
While purportedly affording Dr. Taylor in this case a chance 
to contest the charges brought against him, to cross-examine 
witnesses, rebut documentary evidence and avail himself to the 
adversary proceeding contemplated under the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, the Division now seeks to punish him, without the 
benefit of supporting substantial evidence, for not manifesting 
contrition to the Board and to his accusers. 
An analogue may be the problem avoided in the criminal arena 
by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22, which provides in relevant 
part: "Upon the entry of the plea or verdict of guilty or plea of 
no contest, the court shall set a time for imposing sentence which 
shall be not less than 2 or more than 45 days after the verdict or 
plea . . ." This rule affords a convicted defendant "an 
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence 
should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be 
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given an opportunity to present any information material to the 
imposition of sentence." See Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
22(a). Indeed, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act provides 
that: 
(a) the presiding officer can issue interim 
orders to notify the parties of further 
hearings; (b) notify the parties of 
provisional rulings on a portion of the issues 
presented; or (c) otherwise provide for the 
fair and efficient conduct of the adjudicative 
proceeding. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10(4) (a) through (c) (1988 as amended) . 
Dr. Taylor was not notified in the origiijal Petition that his 
contesting the charges leveled against him and failure to manifest 
contrition were elements of aggravation of his alleged 
unprofessional conduct. See Petition, R 456-468. No evidence was 
presented at trial by the Division supporting a conclusion of Dr. 
Taylor's recalcitrance as a basis for aggravation of his 
unprofessional conduct. Rather than enter its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on that evidence before it, and then reserving 
and ordering a subsequent hearing regarding the imposition of 
sanction and affording Dr. Taylor the opportunity to put on 
evidence appropriately considered in the imposition of sanction, 
the Division merely combined its decision and somehow divined from 
the proceedings that Dr. Taylor's failure to acknowledge his wrong 
to the Board and to his accusers, his failure to make restitution 
or rectify his alleged wrongs and his overall recalcitrance 
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aggravated his alleged unprofessional conduct to the extent that 
his license should be revoked. See Findings, pp. 18-20 (Appendix 
0021-0023). 
By including this determination of aggravation and in its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Division has violated 
Dr. Taylor's due process resulting in substantial prejudice to him 
through the revocation of his license held for over forty years 
without prior sanction. Since the Division's action was 
unconstitutional and as the Division has engaged in an unlawful 
procedure or decision making process and otherwise not availed 
itself to procedure prescribed under the Administrative Procedures 
Act, its Finding must be reversed. 
II. THE REVOCATION OF DR. TAYLOR'S LICENSE IS CONTRARY TO THE 
DIVISION'S PRIOR PRACTICE. 
As provided by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, the 
Utah Court of Appeals shall grant relief, on the basis of an 
agency's record, if it determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced because the agency action 
is contrary to the agency's prior practice. Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-16(4)(h)(iii). However, any agency action which is contrary to 
its prior practice will not mandate this Court's relief if the 
agency justifies its inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that 
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency. Id. 
The Division's revocation of Dr. Taylor's veterinarian license 
here is not just contrary to the Agency's prior practice, it is a 
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complete deviation from all prior formal licensing proceedings 
involving veterinarian licenses. Further, the Division did not 
attempt to justify or support this inconsistency by facts and 
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for it. In 
fact, in all the licensing actions taken against veterinarians, the 
Division has never permanently revoked a veterinarian's license. 
(Copies of substantive documents reflecting all formal action of 
the Division against veterinarians is annexed hereto as Appendix 
0042 through 0173). Of six prior formal licensing proceedings 
involving veterinarians, not one license was suspended from 
veterinary practice entirely for more than a three-month period. 
(Appendix Id.) In stark contrast, Dr. Taylor's license was 
revoked. This drastic departure constitutes a major deviation from 
the Division's prior sanctions and without adequate explanation 
setting forth facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and 
rational basis for its inconsistency, this Court should reverse the 
Division's Order. Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). 
Prior to commencing an action against Dr. Taylor, there have 
been six formal agency actions commenced by the Division involving 
veterinarian licenses. All six prior formal actions involve 
allegations of unprofessional conduct, as is the case at hand. All 
involve conduct related to the practice of veterinarian medicine. 
All apply the identical statutory framework within the same act and 
all resulted in the imposition of a sanction. Combined they 
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represent the prior formal agency action practice of the Division 
against which the sanction in Dr. Taylor's case must be compared. 
This Court interpreted the language of Section 63-46b-
16(4) (h) (iii) in Pickett v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 858 P.2d 187 
(Utah App. 1993). It concluded that provision "clearly and 
unambiguously requires consistent agency action in the absence of 
an adequate rationale for the departure from prior action. The 
language is mandatory and includes neither exceptions nor latitude 
for evading its requirements." Id. at 191. In SEMECO v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993), Justice Durham 
in a dissenting opinion, which this Court has adopted, asserted 
that: 
Part (iii) of subsection (4) (h) permits relief 
for agency action that is contrary to the 
agency's prior practice. This provision also 
demands reasonableness and rationality review, 
explicitly permitting the inconsistency if the 
agency can demonstrate a fair and rational 
basis for it. 
Hence, without exception or latitude, unless the Division provides 
an adequate rational, which review is reasonable and rational, the 
Division's sanction in this case must be consistent with its 
historic practice. Because the Division has failed to demonstrate 
the rationality and reasonableness of its deviation, the Division's 
order should be reversed and remanded for an imposition of a 
consistent sanction. 
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A. Comparing The Six Prior Veterinary Formal 
Licensing Proceedings. 
1. The Division Dismissed A Claim Despite 
Allegations That A Veterinarian Was 
Illegally Practicing Medicine By 
Administering and Prescribing Controlled 
Substances To Human Beings. 
In 1986, R.A.K. was alleged to have treated and prescribed a 
Schedule II controlled substance, methylphenidate, to his son, Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-4 (b) (iii) (D) . R.A.K. was not licensed to 
practice medicine or to administer and prescribe controlled 
substances to human beings. Consequently, his acts constituted 
"violations of the Utah Controlled Substance Act, The Medical 
Practice Act and the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing Act. . .,f Specifically, by prescribing and treating his 
son with methylphenidate, R.A.K. was practicing medicine without a 
license which is a felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30 
(1981 Supp.). In addition, by prescribing the controlled substance 
without a license, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-6(7)(a)(i), R.A.K. was not only subject to license 
revocation, he was also committing a second degree felony offense. 
Further, this willful violation of the law was not a one-time 
occurrence. Rather, R.A.K. was alleged to have knowingly treated 
and prescribed the controlled substance during a continuous period 
from July, 1985 through May, 1986. However, despite R.A.K.'s 
violation of civil and criminal laws, the Department of 
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Professional Licensing on October 21, 1986 summarily dismissed the 
case with prejudice and without any hearing. (Appendix 0042-0050). 
2. The Division Merely Suspended The 
Veterinarians License for Three Months 
Who Was Found Guilty Of Seven Counts Of 
Second Degree Felony Theft, One Count Of 
Third Degree Felony Theft And One Class-
A Misdemeanor For Embezzling Funds From 
A Clinic. 
In 1988, D.W.K. was found guilty of eight counts of felony 
theft and one count of misdemeanor theft. D.W.K. was sentenced to 
60 days in jail, sentenced to probation, fined and required to pay 
restitution. These criminal convictions were the result of stolen 
funds in excess of $16,750.00 payable to the animal clinic in which 
he was one-half owner. Despite the severe nature of the theft 
convictions, D.W.K. argued his crimes did not involve moral 
turpitude. After a full hearing, the Division in its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law held that D.W.K. had engaged in 
unethical business practices and inappropriate judgment which are 
inherent and integral aspects of the veterinarian profession. 
Consequently, the criminal convictions "clearly constitute crimes 
involving moral turpitude by reason of the nature of [D.W.K.'s] 
conduct . . . " However, despite the felonious and immoral nature 
of D.W.K.'s conduct, the Division imposed a mere three-month 
suspension of his veterinary license, which was later stayed in 
lieu of his criminal probation.. (Appendix 0051-0063) . 
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3. In A Case Involving Unprofessional Conduct Of 
A Veterinarian With Respect To The Unsanitary 
And Non-complying Nature Of His Facility, The 
Division Precluded A Veterinarian From 
Practicing Until The Facility Was In Full 
Compliance With Statutes And Rules. 
In January, 1992, N.E.H. was found to be practicing veterinary 
medicine in poor clinical settings. Specifically, N.E.H. failed to 
maintain separate and distinct examination rooms in his veterinary 
practice, violative of R153-28-3(A)(2)(b). The existing room in 
which N.E.H. performed his examinations lacked adequate sanitation 
and disease control and represented "no appropriate effort 
whatsoever to comply with the requirements governing examination 
rooms." In addition, the marble surgical table used by the doctor 
was a semi-porous material which could not be maintained in a 
sanitary condition. N.E.H. also used wire, grocery-type shopping 
carts to house the small animals which were treated and maintained 
at the facility. These enclosures were outdoors and therefore 
could "not assure the comfort or sanitation of any animal which 
might occupy them." Generally, N.E.H. failed to maintain the 
proper physical conditions necessary for a clinic. After a full 
hearing, the Division found and concluded that N.E.H. had violated, 
at one time or another; R 153-28-3 (A) (1) (a) (4) , inadequate lighting 
in a surgery room; R 153-28-3(A) (2) (b) , failure to maintain a 
separate and distinct examination room; R 153-28-3(A)(2)(c) and R 
153-28-3(A)(3)(a), for maintaining an unsanitary surgical table and 
the use of unsanitary wire enclosures to house small animals. 
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Despite his disregard for the animals' care and conditions, and his 
failure to comply with the clearly established rules and 
regulations, N.E.H. was allowed by the Division to continue his 
practice of veterinary medicine but was ordered to get his facility 
into compliance with the specified regulations. N.E.H.'s 
veterinary license went unsanctioned. (Appendix 0064-0084) . 
4. A Veterinarian Was Practicing Medicine On 
Human Beings By Administering Controlled 
Substances In An Attempt To Treat His Sons' 
Attention Deficit Disorders. Despite this 
Unlicensed Practice, The Division Placed The 
Veterinarian's Controlled Substance License 
On One-Year's Probation But His License To 
Practice Veterinarian Medicine Went 
Unsanctioned. 
In May, 1992, R.C.S. was found to have dispensed over a six 
month period, 274 tablets of Ritalin, a Schedule II controlled 
substance, to his two sons in an attempt to treat them for 
Attention Deficit Disorder. R.C.S. dispensed these controlled 
substances knowing his licensure as a veterinarian and his license 
to prescribe and administer controlled substances did not authorize 
him to do so. After a full board hearing, the Division found that 
R.C.S. was engaged in unprofessional conduct and, by prescribing 
and administering a controlled substance without a license, was in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-6(2) (b) , 58-37-2 (a) and 58-28-
2(5). Notably, by dispensing controlled substances without a 
license, R.C.S.'s conduct violated criminal laws which could have 
wrought a second degree felony conviction. R.C.S's privileges to 
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practice veterinary medicine went unsanctioned, R.C.S.'s 
controlled substance license was placed on probation for one year 
and he was cautioned to prescribe and administer controlled 
substances only for appropriate veterinary purposes, (Appendix 
0085-0102) . 
5. Probation For One Year Was The Penalty 
Imposed Upon A Veterinarian Who Allegedly 
Administered And Dispensed A Controlled 
Substance For Purposes Other Than Legitimate 
Veterinary Use. 
In 1990, it was alleged that J.P.R. unlawfully dispensed and 
failed to properly account for 200 tablets of a schedule-II 
controlled substance. It was alleged that J.P.R. was dispensing 
the controlled substances to horse trainers to be administered at 
their discretion in training and to stimulate the horses to run 
faster. J.P.R.'s conduct was unprofessional in that it allegedly 
violated Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-28-6 (m) and 58-37-8 (a) (vi) , for 
administering or dispensing a schedule-II controlled substance for 
non-medical conditions; § 58-17-7(1), for unlawfully engaging in 
the practice of pharmacy without a license; and § 58-37-8(a) for 
failure to make or keep records of his dispensing a schedule-II 
controlled substance. After a formal action was commenced, the 
Division entered into a stipulation with J.P.R. in which he neither 
admitted nor denied the allegations, and was placed on probation 
for a period of one year. (Appendix 0103-0121). 
55 
6. The Division Ultimately Imposed A Three-Year 
Probation On A Veterinarian Who Admitted 
Administering Demerol To Himself, A Schedule-
II Controlled Substance, And Who Maintained 
Fictitious Records To Hide His Personal 
Abuse. 
In 1993, by stipulation, R.A.J, admitted to administering to 
himself doses of Demerol, a schedule-II controlled substance, in 
order to medicate his neck pain. R.A.J, also admitted that he 
maintained fictitious records to account for the Demerol he used, 
including the fabrication with in patient records of the use of the 
drug when none was in fact administered. R.A.J, admitted to 
filling the depleted containers of Demerol with other liquids in an 
attempt to conceal the missing drug he personally used. This 
willful conduct violated Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-28-2(7)(b), for use 
of a controlled substance to an "extent to render him unfit to 
practice veterinary medicine, surgery or dentistry, . . . "; 58-37-
8(2) (a) (i), for use of a controlled substance which was not 
obtained by a valid prescription; and 58-37-6(5) (b) (i) , 58-37-
8(4)(a)(iv) for falsely maintaining records of the disposition of 
his controlled substance inventory and failure to maintain required 
controlled substance records. Upon his stipulation the Division 
stayed R.A.J.'s license revocation in favor of a three-year term of 
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probation subject to certain terms and conditions. (Appendix 0122-
0147) .* 
B. The Division Has Acted In A Manner Inconsistent 
With Its Prior Practice. 
The Division's prior actions, in every instance and as a 
practice, are inconsistent with the Division's order, in this case 
revoking Dr. Taylor's license. In Pickett v. Utah Dept. of 
Commerce, the petitioner Challenged the Division's decision to 
revoke his license because of the inconsistency of his penalty with 
Agency precedent imposing more lenient penalties for similar or 
more egregious misconduct. Pickett, 858 P.2d 187, 190. Pickett 
supported his contention by citing ten Agency decisions in which 
members of his profession committed allegedly equal or more 
significant violations of the law but received substantially 
lighter penalties. The penalties in the cases he cited consisted 
only of brief license suspensions, probation or a combination of 
the two, but no license revocations. Id. at 192. Although the 
*The sanction in this case is an aberration as compared to any action taken by the Division 
against a veterinarian. The Division has been consistent in its practice prior to, and since Dr. 
Taylor's license revocation. Of note, the Division filed a petition on May 24, 1995 in which 
it alleged that GJ . failed to meet professional standards applicable to veterinary medicine in 
Utah by incompetently and negligently performing 12 neuterings and/or spayings, failing to 
provide competent care which resulted in the deaths of several animals and for improperly 
soliciting patronage. In a stipulation and order entered April 23, 1996, one month after Dr. 
Taylor's hearing, 10 days after his Order was entered, in which G.J. does not admit the 
truthfulness of the allegations, and in light of evidence of the deaths of several animals and the 
apparent pattern of negligence, the Division stayed a license revocation in lieu of probation for 
a period of five years. (Appendix 0148-0172). 
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opinion did not describe or compare the alleged facts of each case, 
this Court agreed that Pickett legitimately demonstrated that the 
Division's penalty was inconsistent with the Division's prior 
penalties imposed. The Court concluded that the burden shifted 
onto the Agency to provide "facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency.11 Id. Ultimately, 
this Court concluded that Mr. Pickett's license revocation 
proceeding be remanded for imposition of a less onerous sanction 
because the Division failed to adhere to the UAPA's plain mandate 
that it provide a sufficient rationale for inconsistencies from 
prior Agency action. Id. at 192. 
Like that of Pickett, any attempt by the Division to 
distinguish the prior veterinarian licensing proceedings by simply 
stating that those cases are not factually or procedurally similar 
to the case at hand is of no moment. This distinction, if it in 
fact exists, is neither accurate nor a compelling basis for the 
Division's extraordinary departure from its prior practice. There 
is no case law which requires that review of all prior Agency 
proceedings be factually identical. There is no case law which 
requires a full agency hearing before the case can be compared to 
subsequent Agency actions. The Administrative Procedures Act 
requires that the Division provide reasons that demonstrate a fair 
and rational basis for the inconsistency of the sanction imposed, 
if the sanction in the case in question is "contrary to the 
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agency's prior practice". Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(h)(iii). 
Nothing in the statute limits the review of the agency's historic 
actions to those cases factually apposite, or which ran the full 
course of the administrative procedure available. In determining 
consistency, the rule requires that the instant action be compared 
to the agency's prior practice. Id. If the inconsistency exists, 
the agency must justify it. 
In comparison to the other formal action taken by the 
Division, Dr. Taylor's conduct at best is five isolated instances 
of negligence in his forty year practice of his profession. Dr. 
Taylor's conduct does not involve actions of criminality which 
transcend his veterinary practice. Dr. Taylor did not steal any 
money from his partners. Dr. Taylor did not administer controlled 
substances to his children or to himself, or to others for illicit 
purposes. Dr. Taylor's alleged conduct did not call into question 
issues of moral turpitude. At its worst, Dr. Taylor's conduct 
involves mistakes, blunders, goof-ups, in the course of his 
practice. Likely as a consequence of the Division's inference from 
observations at the hearing of the absence of contrition on the 
part of Dr. Taylor, the Division has interpreted Dr. Taylor's 
mistakes to be so egregious as to warrant revocation of a license 
which has been in existence without sanction for over forty years, 
when historically it has only slapped the hands of convicted and 
alleged felons, drug abusers and a thief. 
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It would seem the Division's imperative to protect the public 
health safety and welfare, is best achieved by sanctioning criminal 
conduct and acts of moral turpitude rather than putting out of 
business long established institutions which for various reasons 
make a few mistakes in the course of practice. See generally, 
Cannon v. Gardner, 611 P.2d 1207, 1210 (Utah 1980); Pickett v. Utah 
Dept. of Commerce, 858 P.2d 187, 190 (Utah App. 1993). 
As in Pickett, the licensing actions cited by Dr. Taylor 
involve alleged unprofessional conduct equal to or greater in 
significance than that alleged against the Petitioner. Allegations 
which include the unlicensed practice of medicine and pharmacology 
on human beings, the use of controlled substances and the overt 
acts to conceal abuse, the embezzlement of funds from a clinic and 
the use and maintenance of an unsanitary facility are far more 
egregious than Dr. Taylor's conduct. In light of the Division's 
historic actions, the burden then is on it to "demonstrate a fair 
and rational basis for the departure from precedent in the instant 
case.11 This the Division failed to do. No where in its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law did the Division find, based on the 
evidence submitted during the hearing, or otherwise conclude 
legally that there was a rational basis for departing from the 
Division's consistent practice. Nor was any explanation of the 
departure provided which this Court could judge based on its 
"reasonableness and rationality." Pickett v. Utah Dept. of 
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Commerce, 858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted). 
The Divisions imposition of sanction in this case must therefore 
fail due to its inconsistency with its historic practice, and as no 
explanation for the departure from the Agency's practice has been 
provided. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Dr. Taylor respectfully 
requests that the Division's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Proposed Order, and the Division's Order be reversed and 
remanded to the Division for entry of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law based on the entire record, and omitting any 
reference to aggravating factors or general conclusions not 
supported by the record. Finally, this matter should be reversed 
and remanded for a hearing on the appropriate sanction to be 
imposed, if any with the instruction that the Division impose a 
sanction on Dr. Taylor's license consistent with its prior 
practices. 
DATED this 1? day of May, 1997. 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
By: / K K ^ V y ^ /—N 
BENSON L. HATHAWAY, jJK & 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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